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The policy statement for evidence-based practice in psychology is the most important
document in contemporary psychotherapy. In its current form, evidence-based practice
in psychology gives scientific research precedence in psychotherapy practice. However,
psychotherapy practice’s complexity warrants reflection beyond the limits of science.
The importance of clinical expert is not recognised in the current policy statement. The
clinical expert is necessary to translate psychological research into clinical practice. It is
also crucial to identify, clarify and include patient preferences in psychotherapy practice.
This paper argues that virtue ethics is a useful theoretical framework for conceptualising
clinical expertise. Clinical expertise is conceptualised as the meta-capacity of practical
wisdom (phronesis) and the virtues necessary for integrating best available research,
clinical expertise and patient preferences.
Keywords: virtue ethics, clinical expertise, psychotherapy practice, evidence-based practice in psychology,
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INTRODUCTION
Evidence-based practice in psychology is the most important regulatory policy-statement in current
psychotherapy. Its historical background includes the work of Archie Cochrane (Howick, 2011).
Cochrane wanted to efface the inferential biases associated with expert-based medicine because
they led to ineffective medical practice. According to Cochrane, randomised controlled trials are
not susceptible to biases. In randomised controlled trials, researchers test treatment efficacy. Two
(or more) equivalent groups are compared. One of the groups are given the treatment, the other
is not. The observed differences after treatment are indicators of treatment efficacy. Randomised
controlled trials were the building blocks in Cochrane’s vision of a public health-care system
(Cochrane, 1999).
The earliest definitions of evidence-based medicine emulated Cochrane’s ideals. Over the course
of some decades, however, evidence-based medicine scholars have revised their models several
times. A significant change was to expand Cochrane’s model into a tripartite model. In the tripartite
model, evidence-based medicine is defined as the integration of best research evidence (preferably,
randomised controlled trials), clinical expertise and patient values. In a subsequent revision, Haynes
et al. (2002) re-instated the clinical expert at the centre of medical practice. In their model, the
clinical expert integrates the three parts in evidence-based medicine.
There is a similar genesis in the regulation of psychotherapy practice. The American
Psychological Association launched the criteria for empirically validated treatments (now
called research supported psychological treatments) (Chambless et al., 1993). In empirically
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validated treatments, randomised controlled trials and single-
subject designs are used to evaluate psychotherapy schools’
treatment efficacy for various psychiatric disorders. Evidence-
based practice in psychology was presented as a more
comprehensive alternative to empirically validated treatments.
Evidence-based practice in psychology is defined as ‘the
integration of the best available research with clinical expertise
in the context of patient characteristics, culture and preferences’
(Levant, 2005).
However, Berg has shown that the part ‘best available research’
define and legitimate the two remaining parts ‘clinical expertise’
and ‘patient characteristics, culture and preferences.’ Thus,
evidence-based practice in psychology only consists of one part
and not of three parts. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for
re-defining evidence-based practice in psychology as a tripartite
model consisting of best available evidence, clinical expertise and
patient characteristics, culture and preferences (Berg, 2019a).
Haynes et al. (2002) argued that a tripartite model needs
a clinical expert to integrate the three parts. Psychotherapy
researchers have deemed clinical expert as the least developed
facet of evidence-based practice in psychology (Norcross et al.,
2008). This warrants more conceptual work on the nature of
clinical expertise in evidence-based practice in psychology. In this
paper, the integrating capacity of the clinical expert is described
using virtue theory. The concept denoting the overarching and
integrating virtue is phronesis or practical wisdom. In addition,
there are three classes of virtues corresponding to the three parts:
best available research, clinical expertise and patient preferences.
These classes of virtues are epistemic virtues, relational virtues,
self-reflective virtues. In each class, non-exhaustive examples of
specific virtues are given.
Virtue Ethics and Psychotherapy
Virtue theory originated in Ancient Greek with the works of
Plato (2012) and Aristotle (2009). The very definition of virtues
indicate why they are relevant for our understanding of clinical
expertise. In virtue theory, goodness is defined according to
the action’s source. The source of human action is the agent’s
character or traits (Waring, 2016). Zagzebski (1996) offers a
relatively comprehensive definition of virtue as: ‘[a] multi-track
character trait or disposition [. . .] involv[ing] a complex mind-set
of fine inner states that inform an array of emotional responses,
desires, motivations, reasons and values’ (Waring, 2016).
First, virtues are deep-rooted excellences that exceed mere
skill. Like skills, they are cultivated through repetition, but
unlike skills they become habitual dispositions which shape
the person’s character and outlook on the world (Radden and
Sadler, 2010). Virtues, moreover, cause a web of characteristic
emotional, cognitive and motivational responses (Waring, 2016).
Thus, to have the virtue of compassion is to somewhat
automatically feel emotional pain when you see suffering,
wanting to understand how to help, activating a set of
rationales for why it is important to help and having values
consistent with helping suffering fellow human beings (Waring,
2016). Second, virtues enable the person possessing them to
bring about certain ends (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).
The virtuous psychotherapist is able to produce the end of
alleviating psychological suffering and increase life-satisfaction.
Third, virtues function to counter therapeutic vices (Pellegrino
and Thomasma, 1993). To be compassionate counters being
cold or remote, at the one hand and over-involving or
invading, at the other.
Phronesis and Integration in
Psychotherapy Practice
Virtue ethicists are concerned with questions relevant to
contemporary health-care. Aristotle described the type
of knowledge and skill most relevant to psychotherapy
practice. It is called phronesis which can be translated
into practical wisdom (Aristotle, 2009). Phronesis can be
contrasted with two other kinds of knowledge; sophia or
pure knowledge (e.g., pure mathematics) and techne or
mere practical skill (e.g., changing a bicycle tire). Phronesis
is the kind of knowledge and skill that enable human
beings to understand and do the right thing in practical
matters. It is ‘the link between the intellectual and the
moral life [. . .] habitually [disposing us] to attain truth for
the sake of action as opposed to truth for its own sake’
(Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).
Phronesis is acquired through accumulating sufficient
practical experience from a variety of situations (including both
professional and non-professional experiences) (Selinger and
Crease, 2006). These experiences shape our outlook on the world.
The manner in which phronesis is acquired suggests something
about the quality of this kind of knowledge. Unlike mathematics
or logic, phronesis is not an exact kind of knowledge. It is an
approximate knowledge entailing a recognition of:
‘[. . .] the anxiety of choice in complex circumstances [. . .]
enabl[ing] us to assess the complexities as accurately as possible and
to approximate, as closely as the circumstances permit, what would
be right and good’ (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).
In clinical practice, phronesis is the indispensable (Pellegrino
and Thomasma, 1993) meta-virtue (Radden and Sadler, 2010).
Phronesis ‘is a guide to the right way of acting with respect
to all the virtues’ (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993). In other
words, it is the key characteristic for an integrating clinical
expert as envisioned in evidence-based practice in psychology.
In this context, phronesis entails the skill and wisdom necessary
for a consistent good practical integration of best available
research, clinical expertise and patient characteristics, culture
and preferences. Radden and Sadler (2010) have presented an
elaborated definition:
[Phronesis] allows us to deliberate about things with ends or goals in
mind, and to discern and enact right action. A grasp of particulars
is required for phronesis, so it comprises cleverness (in the ability to
find what is needed to achieve an end or goal), perception (in order
to notice facts in a situation) and finally, understanding (noûs), a
common and practical good sense (12, my italics).
Within the evidence-based practice in psychology framework,
it means the ability to integrate all of the relevant complexity in
clinical action. Evidence-based practice in psychology (implicitly)
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defines the most relevant complexity through its three parts.
These three parts have three corresponding classes of virtues:
(i) Best available research: Epistemic virtues
(ii) Patient culture characteristics and preferences:
Relational virtues.
(iii) Clinical expertise: Self-reflexive virtues.
Epistemic Virtues
A virtuous clinical expert knows what the right means for the
right ends are. This includes questions of both fact (means) and
value (ends). Moreover, it indicates that theory of knowledge
is ethically relevant. Virtue epistemology telescope questions of
knowledge with questions of ethical character. The overarching
emphasis is the question of being truthful or knowing the truth
(Zagzebski, 1996).
There are two prominent traditions in virtue epistemology.
These are called reliabilism and responsibilism (Zagzebski,
1996). Reliability argue that ‘[e]pistemic virtues are dependable
cognitive tools that enable the inquirer to attain the truth
more often than not’ (Waring, 2016). Responsibilists relate
epistemic virtues to the ‘intellectual habits and dispositions
[and] to the active agency of those who seek truth through
inquiry’ (p. 36). Reliability emphasise the outcome and
responsiblists emphasise the inquiring agency of the knowing
agent. As an overarching ideal, the two positions balance
the need for scientific knowledge (reliabilism) with the need
to questioning and criticising the knowledge base and its
presuppositions (responsibilism). In disciplines with complex
objects of inquiry like psychology there are few clear-cut
‘truths’ (Zagzebski, 1996; Waring, 2016). In psychotherapy, the
typical ultimate aim is a clinical action that helps the patient.
This presupposes a realistic and discerning assessment of the
merits and limitations of the knowledge. Thus, integrity and
intellectual honesty are good examples of key epistemic virtues
(Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).
Due to psychotherapy’s complexity, the clinical expert must
possess the epistemic virtues to understand the merits of
different kinds of knowledge. This entails assessing the epistemic
quality in different kinds of knowledge (Guba and Lincoln,
1994; Woolfolk, 2015; Appelbaum et al., 2018; Levitt et al.,
2018). The risk of interpretative force-fitting (i.e., to use models
inflexibly) makes curiosity and objectivity two relevant epistemic
virtues. Furthermore, the clinical expert needs epistemic
virtues to understand and sometimes confront the fundamental
disciplinary uncertainties in psychotherapy research (e.g.,
nosology, empirical status, research practices, etc.) (Bohart
et al., 1998; Westen et al., 2004; Gupta, 2014; Melchert, 2016;
Jackson, 2017) and the entanglement of questions of facts and
values in psychotherapy (Woolfolk, 2015; Berg and Slaattelid,
2017). This makes the more holistic concept understanding
relevant, as opposed to possessing mere factual knowledge
(Woolfolk, 2015).
Relational Virtues
A classic virtue ethical doctrine states that one should treat only
like cases as alike. In psychotherapy, every patient differs in
clinically significant matters and, presumably, different patients
have different notions of the good life. As noted by Waring
(2016), the entanglement of facts and values in psychotherapy
entails that ‘[patients] want a normative sense of how the
facts and values of their lives “hang together”’ (p. 48). This
is therapeutically significant as ‘[i]t can help to organize and
reconfigure what patients already know about themselves [. . .]
[in] a “larger web of value”’ (Waring, 2016).
The question of what it means for a given patient to live
well invoke the patients’ autonomy to decide over her own
life. Radden and Sadler (2010) argue that: ‘[p]atient autonomy
has become [. . .] the most widely honoured principle in
biomedical ethics (p. 114). In normative ethics, autonomy is
often tied to the tradition of duty ethics, emphasising the
necessity of universal principles and formal rules. Apparently,
formal and universal principles contradicts the approximate and
“common-sensical”’ nature of phronesis. However, in practice
the two traditions may be less contradictory. Pellegrino and
Thomasma (1993) claim that ‘the virtues are conditions of
possibility for the implementation of [such] principles and
moral rules’ (p. 28) the power imbalances between therapist
and patient is an often-existing obstacle for patient autonomy
in psychotherapy. Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) argue that
‘[t]he [psychotherapist] and the patient are not Lockean free
agents equal in bargaining power. The patient is vulnerable [. . .]
[and] has not the power to heal herself ’ (p. 56). Regulatory
principles must encompass the therapeutic relationship and the
therapist’s ability to identify and handle obstacles preventing
patient autonomy.
In order to obtain patient autonomy, patients must be
willing to explore and share their (characteristics, culture and)
preferences. This makes trustworthiness a basic relational
virtue (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993; Radden and
Sadler, 2010). Another crucial relational virtue is empathy
or compassion. This entails an ability to fathom, and to
some extent feel, what the patient is feeling. The demanding
emotional nature of psychotherapy makes fortitude another
relevant relational virtue (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).
The therapist must be perceptive and have the ability to
know when to identify, clarify, nuance, challenge, accept
and praise a given patient. Patients may have a more or
less clear idea about their own culture (or at least the
significance of that culture), characteristics and preferences
necessary for autonomy. Thus, perceptiveness and discernment
must often be combined with patience and perseverance
(Radden and Sadler, 2010).
Self-Reflexive Virtues
Human-beings have the potential for sophisticated self-reflexive
thinking and reasoning about our ‘own subjectivity, psychic states
and traits, including one’s character’ (Radden and Sadler, 2010).
In psychotherapy, the therapist’s interventions reflect various
more or less explicit or deliberate moral or ethical stances
(Hamilton, 2013; Berg, 2019b). To some extent, this entails
that the assessment of a patient reflects the psychological state,
personality moral evaluations, knowledge base and socio-cultural
background of the therapist. Thus, a hermeneutical reflection of
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how the therapist understands is often as informative as what the
therapist knows about a patient (Woolfolk, 2015).
Another important argument for promoting self-
knowledge is that it creates self-unity. In psychotherapy,
self-unity is tied to other therapeutic virtues such as
genuineness and wholeheartedness. Psychotherapy consists
of a great number of subtle micro-processes (Stern
et al., 1998). Self-unity, genuineness and wholeheartedness
arguably reduces the probability of detrimental psychic
blind-spots influencing the psychotherapeutic work
(Radden and Sadler, 2010). This is important to take
into consideration because automatic and unconscious
content can play a pivotal part in psychotherapy
(Maroda, 1991).
Another key self-reflexive virtue is temperance. Pellegrino
and Thomasma (1993) argues that temperance ‘represents
a kind of victory over desire, a science of the self [and]
the individual’s self-mastery is equated [. . .] with wisdom
(p. 118). There are many kinds of therapist needs that are
impertinent in psychotherapy. These vices lead therapists
astray from the ultimate concern in therapy, which is to
alleviate the patient’s suffering. One example is therapist
idealisation. This makes “unselfing”’ and self-effacement
important self-reflexive virtues (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993;
Radden and Sadler, 2010).
CONCLUSION
Emphasising the role of phronesis in psychotherapy practice
is at odds with the current scientocentric conceptualisation
of best psychotherapy practice. The principal contention is
whether scientific inquiries have the merits to guide clinical
action directly. This paper claims that a good application of
scientific results in psychotherapy practice hinges upon phronesis.
Phronesis is a practical sensibility starting with particulars and
reflections regarding what would be a good aim in each individual
instance. In addition, psychotherapy practice implies a cluster
of facts and values (including patient preferences) necessitating
extra-scientific deliberations (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993;
Berg and Slaattelid, 2017). Virtuous clinical experts are able to
integrate the complexities of psychotherapy to the benefit of their
patients. This critique does not render scientific findings and
patient preferences unimportant. On the contrary, it shows how
these elements should be critically evaluated and integrated in
clinical practice.
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